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100 N.C. L. REV. 1311 (2022)

Doing Less with More: Why the Fourth Circuit Missed Its Chance To
Raise the Floor of Mental Health Care for Detained Persons*
In the 2021 case Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Detention Center
Commission, the Fourth Circuit confronted the question of how to measure the
minimum level of mental health care guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution for
unaccompanied alien children (“UAC”) in state custody. The plaintiffs, a
certified class of UACs, argued that this question should be evaluated under the
“professional judgment” standard—an approach that is more plaintiff-friendly,
at least ostensibly, than the “deliberate indifference” standard applied by the
district court. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs,
raising the baseline of mental health treatment for this narrow class of detainees.
However, a closer look at the case reveals that the court’s holding may not be
the boon to detainees’ rights as may appear at first blush.
This Recent Development examines the implications of the majority’s decision to
apply the professional judgment standard to UACs and suggests the court could
have achieved a greater effect on simpler and less fallible legal ground. This
requires an honest look at the practical difficulties of applying this new standard,
the court’s commitment to outdated legal concepts, and the holding’s long-term
viability.
By glossing over these considerations, the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity
not only to raise the floor of mental health care for UACs, but for detained
persons generally. In response, this Recent Development argues that by simply
recalibrating the deliberate indifference standard to comport more with its
application in adjacent circuits, the Fourth Circuit could have achieved a more
administratively tenable result that reflects the realities of the contemporary state
detention system. Perhaps even more importantly, this Recent Development
argues that this strategy would have protected a broader class of detainees while
immunizing the outcome from the prospect of judicial repeal.
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2018, a certified class of unaccompanied alien children
(“UAC”) filed suit against the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (“SVJC”)
for failing to provide them with a constitutionally adequate level of mental
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health care.1 John Doe 4, the named plaintiff whose experience was emblematic
of the class as a whole, was a teenage Honduran immigrant who fled his home
country after he was the victim of and witness to a string of violent incidents,
including beatings, stabbings, murders, and threats against his family.2 After
being apprehended at the border, he was shuttled through various outposts of
the U.S. juvenile detention system.3 By the time he arrived at SVJC, he had
been diagnosed with a range of emotional disorders, ranging from posttraumatic stress disorder to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had
demonstrated a pattern of dangerous, self-harming behavior.4 While under the
SVJC’s watch, the facility’s staff ignored his symptoms, subjected him to
hundreds of hours of solitary confinement, and targeted him with unprovoked
physical violence.5 One witness testified that the facility’s shift supervisors
responded to indications of self-harming conduct by detainees “with comments
like ‘let them cut themselves’ and ‘[l]et them go bleed out.’”6 On summary
judgment, the district court ruled in favor of SVJC, holding that they had met
their constitutional duty regarding the level of mental health care they were
required to provide.7 Central to their reasoning was where UACs fell on the
boundary between the “civilly” and “penally” detained.8
The words “state custody” conjure images of arrest, prison, and the tangled
appendages of the U.S. penal system. But there is a myriad of reasons why
individuals might find themselves in government detention beyond having
been convicted of a crime. Courts and legislatures rely on two rough categories
when classifying individuals under state detention—civil detainees and penal
detainees.9 Civil detainees are characterized as the “involuntarily committed”

1. Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458 (W.D. Va. 2018),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
2. Shenandoah Valley, 985 F.3d at 329–31.
3. Id. at 331–32.
4. Id. at 332.
5. Id. at 332–33.
6. Id. at 334 (quoting Joint Appendix at 1176, 1178, Shenandoah Valley, 985 F.3d 327 (No. 191910) (sealed)).
7. Id. at 327.
8. See Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468 (W.D. Va. 2018),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.
2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
9. See generally id. (relying on a “security” versus “treatment” framework); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (distinguishing the “involuntarily committed” from other forms of state
detention traced to a legal infraction); Jordan v. District of Columbia, 161 F. Supp. 3d 45, 57 (D.D.C.
2016) (relying on a distinction between the “civilly committed” and criminally committed); Ellis M.
Johnston, Note, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal? Unconstitutional Presumptions for Mandatory
Detention of Criminal Aliens, 89 GEO. L.J. 2593, 2621 (2001) (describing a “regulatory-punitive”
dichotomy).
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and might include minors with no legal guardian,10 undocumented immigrants,11
or the physically or mentally infirm.12 Penal detainees, or the “voluntarily
committed,” include the criminally accused or convicted.13 The group into
which an individual falls has a material effect on the type and quality of baseline
necessities the government is constitutionally required to provide.14
While the theoretical line between civil and criminal commitment makes
intuitive sense, the distinction crumbles with a cursory look at the modern state
detention system, where it is often impossible to draw a coherent line between
the two classifications. Broadly, courts tend to defer to how state legislatures
choose to define and differentiate between civil and criminal penalties,15
meaning that the same action that demands criminal punishment in one state
might only justify a civil penalty in another.16 To complicate matters further,
criminal and civil penalties are often identical “in contexts such as long-term
civil commitment, in which the sanction is the same as that imposed after a
criminal trial.”17 Finally, and most strikingly, civil and penal detainees are often
housed together in state facilities.18 Therefore, what qualifies as constitutionally
adequate care for one detainee might be a constitutional violation for their
cellmate, evidencing the difficulties of ensuring that each respective class of
detainees receives the degree of mental health care to which they are
constitutionally entitled.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with these complications
in Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission.19 The central issue was
which standard—“professional judgment” or “deliberate indifference”—courts
should use to measure the constitutionally required minimum for mental health
care in juvenile detention facilities.20 In theory, the professional judgment
10. Shenandoah Valley, 985 F.3d at 329.
11. Id.
12. Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 2001).
13. Id. at 841.
14. See, e.g., Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing the varying standards
of minimally adequate mental health care for individuals under state custody). The Fourteenth
Amendment standard, which governs “pretrial detainees,” is objective in nature and asks if the victim
had a verifiable medical need to which the detention center medical staff turned a purposeful blind eye.
See Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 987–89 (7th Cir. 1998). The Fourteenth
Amendment standard is ostensibly more demanding than the Eighth Amendment standard reserved
for convicted prisoners and requires a showing of actual knowledge. See id.
15. See, e.g., César Cuauhthémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1358 (2014); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1896 n.41 (2000) (“The
States have long been able to plan their own procedures around the traditional distinction between civil
and criminal remedies.” (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1988))).
16. See Kanstroom, supra note 15, at 1896 n.41.
17. Id. at 1926.
18. Hernández, supra note 15, at 1386–88.
19. 985 F.3d 327 (2021).
20. Id. at 339.
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standard is more plaintiff-friendly.21 However, in practice, the two standards
tend to lead to the same results—tilting heavily in favor of defendants.22 If the
majority’s goal was to establish a more plaintiff-friendly standard by
deemphasizing the distinction between civil and penal detention, the court
would have gotten more bang for its buck by refining the deliberate indifference
standard rather than giving new life to the professional judgment standard,
which has steadily trended toward dormancy in the decades since the U.S.
Supreme Court introduced it.
This Recent Development analyzes the implications of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision to apply the professional judgment standard instead of the
deliberate indifference standard in cases involving UACs. In doing so, the piece
examines whether the application of the professional judgment standard is an
administratively tenable result, how the two standards differ, and the holding’s
long-term viability. Ultimately, this Recent Development will question whether
the court missed an opportunity to refine a single uniform standard that would
have had a longer-lasting effect for a broader class of detained individuals.
Part I of this analysis discusses the background of Shenandoah Valley, and
Part II examines the frayed distinction between civil and penal detainees. Part
III evaluates the difference (or lack thereof) between the deliberate indifference
and professional judgment standards and why favoring the professional
judgment standard was a suspect decision by the Fourth Circuit. Lastly, Part
IV looks at how a bolstering of the deliberate indifference standard would have
both better achieved the court’s goals and immunized it from backlash.
I. RELEVANT FACTS OF SHENANDOAH VALLEY
Plaintiffs in Shenandoah Valley were a class of UACs who filed a § 1983
claim against SVJC for failing to provide a “constitutionally adequate level of
mental health care.”23 The trial court ruled in favor of SVJC’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the facility met the deliberate indifference
standard for “provid[ing] adequate care by offering access to counseling and
medication.”24 On appeal, Doe 4 argued that because involuntarily committed
psychiatric patients are (1) detained for the purpose of receiving treatment, (2)
housed in facilities staffed by medical professionals, and (3) often subject to
long-term confinement, the lower court should have applied the supposedly less
21. See id. at 343; Rosalie Berger Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg’s
Protection of Liberty for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 566–69 (2013).
22. See, e.g., Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 846 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the difference
between the deliberate indifference and professional judgment standards had no impact on the outcome
of the case).
23. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 583 (2021).
24. Id.
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stringent professional judgment standard in assessing whether SVJC failed to
meet its constitutional obligations to its detainees.25 While both standards
evaluate claims of inadequate medical care, deliberate indifference requires a
subjective showing that a state official actually knew about a detainee’s medical
need and disregarded it.26 In contrast, the professional judgment standard
requires an objective showing that an official “substantially” departed from
professional judgment.27 The plaintiffs’ lawyers argued that switching the
evaluative standard would change the outcome of the case.
The court focused its analysis on the purpose for which the UACs had
been detained. As mentioned, there is a wide spectrum of reasons for why the
state might take custody of an individual. Identifying a precise, or even a
primary reason for why an individual is detained is a difficult task. In
Shenandoah Valley, the majority and dissent both agreed that the state had
detained the plaintiff UACs, at least in part, to maintain safety.28 They drew
their battle line on the question of whether the UAC’s need for adequate
medical treatment was a coequal purpose for their detention.29
The court argued that “the aims of treatment and safety [were] intertwined
in this case,” meaning that the state’s interest in security could not be divorced
from the UAC’s interest in adequate mental health care.30 Therefore, the
majority determined that UACs were entitled to a less draconian standard than
their counterparts who were held for punitive purposes and held that the
professional judgment standard should have been applied.31
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court not only to assess
the facts under the professional judgment standard but also to determine
whether the “trauma-informed system of care” standard functioned as the lowwater mark for the adequacy of mental health care for involuntarily committed
UACs.32 The court, relying on one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, articulated
the tenets of trauma-informed care in doctrinal fashion: “(1) ‘appropriate
[clinical or therapeutic] interventions,’ (2) ‘a more global or systems
perspective’ to consider less restrictive alternatives to detention, and (3) staff
25. Id. at 339.
26. Id. at 340.
27. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
28. Compare id. at 340 (discussing safety as one of the aims of housing children in SVJC), with id.
at 348 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that facilities like SVJC were “designed to house youths
too dangerous to be safely housed elsewhere” (citing 45 C.F.R. § 411.5 (2020))).
29. Compare id. at 340–41 (majority opinion) (“If a child is held at SVJC until he no longer
behaves aggressively, and this aggressive behavior arises from an underlying traumatic condition, then
it follows that SVJC’s efforts to improve a child’s behavior should also treat the child’s underlying
trauma that gives rise to the misbehavior.”), with id. at 348 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (discussing that
SVJC’s main priority is ensuring safety and controlling dangerous behavior).
30. Id. at 340–41 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 344.
32. Id. at 342–44, 346.
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‘relying less on the use of restraint and seclusion.’”33 There is little doubt that
pegging these elements to the accepted standard of professional judgment
would raise the minimum baseline of mental health treatment for involuntarily
detained UACs. While this is a laudable step with the potential to improve
treatment conditions for UACs, the legal basis for the majority’s holding was
vulnerable—and the dissent pounced.
Writing for the dissent, Judge Wilkinson covered the predictable
arguments against remanding the case under the resuscitated professional
judgment standard. Notably, he accused the court of putting judges in a position
to evaluate substantive medical questions, a task that they are “utterly
unqualified to do”34 and criticized the creation of a circuit split by adopting the
professional judgment standard over the deliberate indifference standard.35
More importantly, implicit in the dissent’s critique is a roadmap for how the
majority could have reached the same outcome on more stable legal ground. By
neglecting to adequately account for the weak points in its own reasoning, the
court missed an opportunity to both fortify its position against backlash and
protect a broader class of detained persons.
II. THE HAZY LINE BETWEEN CIVIL AND PENAL DETENTION
In Shenandoah Valley, the core tension between the majority and dissent
revolves around why the members of the plaintiff class had been detained.36
Both sides agree that the plaintiffs were placed at SVJC for security reasons.37
The majority took the position that no matter how great the security risk that
the plaintiffs represent, they are entitled to minimally adequate mental health
care.38 The dissent, however, argued that the state’s interest in security
outweighs the need to provide adequate mental health care because providing
mental health care would interfere with keeping the detainees under control.39
But what the dissent fails to realize, and the majority underemphasizes, is that
the line between these two interests no longer exists within the modern state
detention system. Before illustrating this point, it is helpful to understand the
33. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Joint Appendix at 1132–33, Shenandoah Valley, 985 F.3d 327 (No. 191910) (sealed)).
34. Id. at 352 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 348.
36. Id. at 340 (majority opinion) (“[T]he need to institutionalize the plaintiff for security reasons
did not undermine the fact that he also needed to be committed for treatment.”).
37. Id. at 350–51 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (explaining that Doe 4 was transferred to SVJC
because he was “dangerous” and that the majority “insist[s] that safety and rehabilitation are not
mutually exclusive”).
38. Compare id. at 340 (majority opinion) (“Indeed, the aims of treatment and safety are
intertwined in this case.”), with id. at 348 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“SVJC . . . is not designed to be
a mental health treatment center. It prioritizes detainee safety and controlling violent behavior.”).
39. Id. at 351 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (explaining that SVJC’s only priority is maintaining
security and safety).
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terminology because the courts use common phrases on both sides of the civilpenal dichotomy.
A.

Disentangling the Civil-Penal Dichotomy

Civil detention is often described as “involuntary,” presumably because
the need for the state to take custody of the individual is beyond their control.
Detainees falling under this category are guaranteed Fourteenth Amendment
protections, including the right “to be free from harm and to receive appropriate
medical treatment.”40 Individuals who face civil detention include the mentally
disabled,41 psychiatric patients,42 sex offenders,43 suicidal individuals,44 and
neglected youths.45 Commonly cited rationales for taking members of these
groups into state custody include the need for rehabilitation,46 protection of
others,47 and protection from themselves.48
Contrarily, penal detention is synonymous with prison, drawing a clear
connection between the detainee’s intended conduct and the need for the state
taking custody. Penal detainees include convicted criminals49 and pretrial
detainees.50 Both criminal and pretrial detainees are protected by the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and by extension
“require[s] the state to provide . . . detained, committed, or incarcerated persons
minimum levels of the basic human necessities,” including medical care and
reasonable safety.51 Because there is an underlying punitive rationale for
committing these classes to state custody, deprioritizing their medical care in
the name of “maintaining institutional security” is seen as justified.52
With the theoretical underpinnings of the civil-penal dichotomy
explained, one can more easily conceptualize that the actual distinction between
the two classifications is practically meaningless. As discussed in the
Introduction of this Recent Development, whether an offense is considered civil
or criminal is not determined by the U.S. Constitution, but by the whim of a

40. A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 577 (2004).
41. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309–10 (1982).
42. Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 2001).
43. Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2017).
44. Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1998).
45. Jordan v. District of Columbia, 161 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2016).
46. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 350–54 (4th Cir.) (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
47. Id. at 351.
48. Id.
49. Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 834 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104–05 (1976)).
50. Id. at 841.
51. Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 987–88 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. See J.H. v. Williamson County, 951 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir. 2020).
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state’s legislature.53 Furthermore, individuals in both civil and penal detention
are often treated identically and for similar periods of time, making the civil
and penal confinement indistinguishable.54
Albeit at different ends of the spectrum, both the majority and the dissent
remain committed to upholding the civil-penal boundary in Shenandoah Valley.
In doing so, both sides stumble over how to assess the constitutional minimum
for the mental health care of UACs.
B.

Where UACs Fall: A Gray Area Within a Gray Area

UACs find themselves at the intersection of two classes of detainees that
straddle the already blurry civil-penal line: illegal immigrants and juveniles. A
closer look at both classes punctuates the near complete erosion of the line
between civil and penal confinement and sheds light on why the labored analysis
in which the Shenandoah Valley court engages is futile.
Both courts and legislatures justify the widespread detention of
undocumented immigrants on the grounds that they might flee the country or
neglect to appear for their immigration hearings.55 While undocumented
immigrants are “almost universally” considered civil detainees,56 once they
funnel into the detention system,
[p]eople serving time as a sanction for engaging in criminal activity are
housed in the same facilities as people waiting to receive an immigration
court’s decision. . . . By so intertwining immigration detention and penal
incarceration, Congress created an immigration detention legal
architecture that, in contrast with the prevailing legal, characterization is
formally punitive.57
Even more telling is the juvenile justice system itself, which was overtly
based on a medical model.58 By taking a medical approach to juvenile offenders,
there is no way to disentangle the state’s interest in security from the juvenile’s
interest in rehabilitation. In this context, the two interests are fused and likely
overlap.

53. See supra Introduction.
54. See supra Introduction; Hernández, supra note 15, at 1386.
55. Johnston, supra note 9, at 2594 (“[T]he INS must detain all criminal aliens during the
deportation process regardless of whether or not they pose a flight or safety risk.”); Hernández, supra
note 15, at 1353 (“[C]ivil detention is permissible to ensure that an accused appears for legal
proceedings . . . .”).
56. See Hernández, supra note 15, at 1351.
57. Id. at 1349.
58. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation of a Right to Mental Health Treatment
for Juvenile Offenders, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 61, 64–65 (2004) (“[A]s was the avowed purpose of its
founders, juvenile justice administrators can be viewed as being required to triage the ‘sickest’
individuals within the system.” (footnote omitted)).
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Regardless of the terminology used, because the civilly and penally
detained are all part of a system that does very little to distinguish between
them, utilizing multiple standards to measure the adequacy of medical care is
both unnecessary59 and administratively untenable. For example, how can a
county jail, which at any given time may hold pretrial detainees, undocumented
immigrants, or convicted criminals, effectively and assuredly provide a
constitutionally acceptable level of mental health care? The most efficient and
just way to do this is to increase the minimum baseline of mental health care
for all detained individuals—not to develop a slightly different standard for
each class of detainee.
III. THE DIFFERENCE, OR LACK THEREOF, BETWEEN DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
In Shenandoah Valley, the Fourth Circuit’s holding is flawed not only
because it doubles down on the antiquated civil-penal distinction but also
because it labors to differentiate the professional judgment standard from the
deliberate indifference standard to the extent that it will yield different results.
Prior to the Shenandoah Valley decision, the difference between the two
standards fell somewhere between very small and nonexistent.60 While the
Supreme Court did apparently intend for the professional judgment standard
to be an easier threshold for plaintiffs to meet, many jurisdictions interpreted
the standard in subsequent decisions that effectively neutralized the test’s bite.61
In many cases, even when plaintiffs succeeded in convincing courts to apply the
professional judgment standard, those same courts still ruled in favor of
defendant detention facilities.62
To distinguish between these two standards, the Fourth Circuit took the
controversial step of assigning trauma-informed care to the professional
judgment standard, holding that a failure to consider this when interacting with
SVJC detainees could be a constitutional violation.63 By singling out traumainformed care, the Fourth Circuit gave courts plenty of ammunition to ignore,
peel back, or limit its holding in the future. First, this violates the basic legal
59. See supra Part II. If the application of the professional judgment or deliberate indifference
standards depends on the civil or penal characterization, and if the standards functionally lead to the
same results, the civil-penal distinction is unnecessary.
60. Levinson, supra note 21, at 561–65 (explaining that the deliberate indifference and professional
judgment standards are either equivalent or not very different from each other).
61. See id. at 536–38. The Court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998), have “fueled” the “erosion” of Youngberg’s protection of substantive due process. Levinson,
supra note 21, at 536.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
63. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 342–46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
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underpinnings of the professional judgment standard, which is predicated on
the standard used in medical malpractice cases that emphasize a deference to
custom established by expert opinion. Second, it violates the Supreme Court’s
directive that “[i]t is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made.”64
A.

Professional Judgment, Medical Malpractice, and Deference to Custom

A closer look at the origins of the professional judgment standard reveals
why it is a suspect mechanism to raise the constitutional minimum for mental
health care for both UACs and detained persons in general. In Youngberg v.
Romeo,65 the case that established the professional judgment standard, the
Supreme Court highlighted the professional judgment standard’s close
connection to the negligence standard applied in medical malpractice cases.
There, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “the substantive rights
of involuntarily committed [intellectually disabled] persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”66 The plaintiff had a severe intellectual disability,
and although he was thirty-three years old at the time that the lawsuit reached
the Supreme Court, he was operating with the mental capacity of an eighteenmonth-old child.67 After the plaintiff’s father died, his mother petitioned to
have him involuntarily committed to a state facility, and a local court committed
the plaintiff to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital.68 During his two years
living at the facility, the plaintiff “suffered injuries on at least sixty-three
occasions.”69
At trial, after being instructed to apply the deliberate indifference
standard, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant facility.70 On
appeal, the Third Circuit remanded for a new trial on the grounds that it was
not appropriate to evaluate an Eighth Amendment claim and a Fourteenth
Amendment claim under identical standards.71 The en banc court agreed on the
need for a new Fourteenth Amendment standard, but they could not agree on
which standard should apply.72 The majority landed on what was in effect a
medical malpractice standard, suggesting that any departure from what is
“acceptable in the light of the present medical or other scientific knowledge”

64. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
178 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
65. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
66. Id. at 314.
67. Id. at 309.
68. Id. at 309–10.
69. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
70. See id. at 312.
71. See id. at 312–13.
72. Id. at 313.
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could be grounds for a constitutional violation.73 Chief Judge Seitz concurred
in the judgment, but suggested that the medical malpractice standard offered
too low of a threshold for plaintiffs challenging under the Constitution, and
consequently tweaked the standard so that only a state facility’s “substantial
departure” from accepted medical or scientific custom would result in a
violation.74 Ultimately, the Supreme Court adopted Chief Judge Seitz’s
proposed standard, and the professional judgment standard was born.75
Because the professional judgment standard is a modified version of the
medical malpractice standard, prior examples of courts attaching specific
professional practices to the minimum duty of care provide a useful data point
when assessing how similar decisions, like the majority in Shenandoah Valley,
hold up over time. Examining this connection yields an important insight,
which calls into question Shenandoah Valley’s long-term viability—when courts
wade into specific medical care strategies and unilaterally raise the standard of
care required, they are vulnerable to swift backlash. While the case law is limited
here,76 the few examples that do exist are revealing.
1. Potential Backlash for Misapplying the Professional Judgment Standard
Helling v. Carey,77 a 1974 decision from the Washington Supreme Court,
offers one of the few illustrations of a judicial body attaching a specific medical
test to the standard of care.78 In that case, the court held defendant-physicians
liable for negligence79 even though their actions were in accordance with what
other qualified medical providers would have done at the time.80 Although the
very fact that most other physicians would have treated their patients similarly
would have ordinarily been enough to discharge their duty of care,81 the Helling
court found that the practice of ophthalmologists generally had fallen below the
73. Id. at 313 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated,
457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
74. Id. at 314 (emphasis added) (quoting Romeo, 644 F.2d at 173 (en banc) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring)).
75. Id. at 319.
76. See Philip G. Peters Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 171 (2000) (“No other court has endorsed the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision to take the issue of medical negligence away from the jury and to rule,
without the benefit of expert testimony, that a customary practice is negligent as a matter of law.”).
77. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash.) (en banc).
78. Id. at 983.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 982–83.
81. Peters, supra note 76, at 165 (“[T]raditional tort law ‘gives the medical profession . . . the
privilege . . . of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices.’”
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th ed. 1984))); id. (“Although physicians are expected to behave
reasonably, the reasonableness of their conduct is determined by ascertaining their compliance with
customary practices.”).
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minimum standard of care.82 The majority invoked Justice Holmes to articulate
its rationale, citing Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer,83 in which the former
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned, “What usually is
done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is
fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with
or not.”84
With respect to the professional judgment standard, Helling’s aftermath is
more revealing than its outcome. Within one year of the decision, the
Washington state legislature repealed the decision via statute.85 And within
three years, courts in Washington, California, and Texas expressly refused to
adopt the Washington Supreme Court’s approach in Helling, effectively
cabining the holding to “its own unique facts.”86 The impetus for such backlash
is not well documented. Some legal commentary suggests that this was the
result of a strong lobbying effort by the state’s medical community.87 Other
sources point to the Helling court’s misunderstanding of the medical data upon
which it justified its mandate for a higher level of medical screening, which led
to increased medical costs but no increase in the “efficacy of treatment.”88 If
Helling’s aftermath is any indication for the potential of backlash to a medical
malpractice tort claim, the future does not bode well for Shenandoah Valley—a
decision that involves far more culturally and politically divisive issues than
medical malpractice.
2. Fertile Ground for Judicial Backlash
Judicial backlash in future § 1983 cases is a legitimate threat to Shenandoah
Valley’s holding. By delving into the vices and virtues of trauma-informed care,
the Fourth Circuit “undertook the prohibited task of specifying”89 what form of
medical treatment should have been followed by the defendant, in direct
contravention of how the Supreme Court intended for the standard to be
applied.90 What is more, the defendants in Shenandoah Valley made this the
central point in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.91 Although
82. Helling, 519 P.2d at 982–83.
83. 189 U.S. 468 (1903).
84. Id. at 470 (citing Wabash Railway Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454 (1882)).
85. Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 345, 380–81 (1981).
86. See id. at 360 nn.80–82 (quoting Swanson v. Brigham, 571 P.2d 217, 219 (1977)).
87. Id. at 381.
88. Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for
Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1504–05 (1989).
89. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n v. Doe 4, 985
F.3d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021) (No. 21-48).
90. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
178 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
91. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 23–26.
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the Court denied the petition,92 the majority’s application of the standard is
directly out of line with the Supreme Court’s instruction, offering a convincing
out for any future court that may be hostile to Shenandoah Valley’s lead.
The prospect of plaintiffs similar to the UACs in Shenandoah Valley
encountering a hostile court is not an abstract threat. The Shenandoah Valley
majority took the controversial step of elevating the rights of a class of detainees
that sits squarely at the center of two politically incendiary issues: detainees’
rights and immigration. While the degree to which the judiciary is truly
insulated from political and ideological considerations is beyond the scope of
this Recent Development, much has been made regarding the trend towards the
politicization of the court system, especially since 2016.93 As of 2019, former
President Trump had appointed more circuit court judges than any other
president, making one in four circuit court judges a Trump appointee.94 His
appointees are likely to be committed to a political ideology and “have a . . . less
cautious view about the costs of significant judicial interventions and the
benefits of incremental conservativism.”95 With a judiciary stacked with new
appointees with strong ideological worldviews, there is fertile ground for
judicial backlash to either ignore, peel back, or severely limit the applicability
of Shenandoah Valley’s holding.
If courts succeed in thrashing the Fourth Circuit’s protection of the mental
health of UACs in the future, they are back to square one, and government
detention facilities will be free to ignore and thereby put detainees with mental
illness at serious risk. To put this in perspective, the medical condition at issue
in Helling, glaucoma in patients under forty, affects roughly 13,000 people in
this country every year.96 In 2020 alone, 60,000 UACs came into the United

92. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n v. Doe 5, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021) (mem.).
93. See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda
Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appealscourt-judges.html [https://perma.cc/E6PD-D3A8 (dark archive)] (Mar. 16, 2020); Catherine Y. Kim
& Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579,
579 (2020); Peter L. Strauss, Eroding “Checks” on Presidential Authority—Norms, the Civil Service, and the
Courts, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 581, 589 (2019).
94. Rebecca Klar, Trump Has Officially Appointed One in Four Circuit Court Judges, HILL (Nov. 7,
2019, 6:05 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/469519-trump-has-officially-appointed
-one-in-four-circuit-court-judges [http://perma.cc/FDG2-WTMN].
95. David Zaring, The Organization Judge, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2020), https://
lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/09/25/zaring-judge/ [https://perma.cc/EKW8-9URW].
96. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (“[T]he instance of glaucoma under the age
of 40 . . . is thought to be . . . one in 25,000 people or less.”). The current population of the United
States is roughly 330 million. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/R9LF-5ZXE]. 330 million divided by 25,000 is about 13,200.
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States,97 44% of whom have at least one medically recognizable emotional
concern.98
In the next part, I argue that the Fourth Circuit could have reached a
functionally identical outcome by simply refining the deliberate indifference
standard without running afoul of the Supreme Court and preventing a clear
opportunity to disregard its outcome. If illegal immigrants and juveniles occupy
the gray area between the civil-penal divide,99 UACs’ status with respect to their
constitutionally required level of mental health care is doubly uncertain. By
categorizing UACs as civil detainees, the majority obfuscates the fact that
remanding the case to be evaluated under the professional judgment standard—
which is functionally equivalent to the deliberate indifference standard—does
little to raise the constitutional minimum for mental health care for detained
persons.
IV. WHY FORTIFYING THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD DOES
MORE WITH LESS
Any update to existing law that works in favor of a vulnerable and
underrepresented class should be applauded, and at least for the time being, the
Fourth Circuit accomplished this in its Shenandoah Valley decision. However,
the court missed an opportunity to make a more meaningful, widespread impact
within a more doctrinally sound approach. By simply fortifying the deliberate
indifference standard, they would have raised the bar for minimally adequate
mental health care for all detainees in the Fourth Circuit—not just involuntarily
committed UACs.
A.

Subjective Deliberate Indifference vs. Objective Deliberate Indifference

The deliberate indifference standard affords a court more flexibility than
what might be immediately apparent upon reading the Shenandoah Valley
decision. The majority spent considerable time drawing a distinction between
the standard applied in § 1983 claims brought under the Eighth Amendment
and those brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.100 What the Fourth
Circuit failed to emphasize is that there are gradients within the deliberate

97. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN
CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2021).
98. Sarah A. MacLean, Priscilla O. Agyman, Joshua Walter, Elizabeth K. Singer, Kim A.
Baranowski & Craig L. Katz, Mental Health of Children Held at a United States Immigration Detention
Center, 230 SOC. SCI. & MED. 303, 303 (2019).
99. See supra Section II.B.
100. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 343–44 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
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indifference standard that include both a subjective and objective analysis.101
Courts in other circuits apply the objective deliberate indifference standard in
cases that involve municipal rather than individual liability.102 This version of
the standard replaces the requirement that a government official must have had
actual knowledge that the detainee had a mental illness with the requirement
that the government knew or should have known that the detainee had been
diagnosed with a mental illness.103 Here, since the defendant Shenandoah Valley
Juvenile Center Commission is a municipality, the facts of this case would have
been ideally suited for the court to apply such a standard.
The Third Circuit’s decision in A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention
Center104 employed a version of the objective deliberate indifference test without
expressly saying so, offering a model for how the Fourth Circuit could have
accomplished this.105 In Luzerne County, the majority held that the lower court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Luzerne County
Juvenile Detention Center and its supervisors and remanded for further
proceedings based on its analysis of the deliberate indifference standard.106 The
majority applied the deliberate indifference standard more expansively than the
Fourth Circuit, holding that “the custodial setting of a juvenile detention center
presents a situation where ‘forethought about [a resident’s] welfare is not only
feasible but obligatory.’”107 With this backdrop, the court looked beyond the
precise actions of individual state actors.108 In the Third Circuit, the deliberate
indifference standard can implicate a facility’s training and general policies in
evaluating whether a state detention center is liable for providing inadequate
mental health care.109
Alternatively, had the Shenandoah Valley majority remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to apply the objective deliberate indifference
standard in line with the Third Circuit’s interpretation, there would have been
no need to breathe new life into the dormant professional judgment standard.
Had this case been brought in the Third Circuit, the facts of Shenandoah Valley

101. See, e.g., Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Potential Impact
of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059, 2061–62 (2016).
102. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. Magun, supra note 101, at 2062–63.
104. 372 F.3d 571 (3d Cir. 2004).
105. For more context regarding the facts of Luzerne County, see supra Part II.
106. Luzerne County, 372 F.3d at 579–85.
107. Id. at 579 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998)).
108. Id. at 580–85.
109. Id. (concluding that the defendant juvenile detention center’s policies pertaining to hiring,
staffing, training, ensuring youth safety, and addressing residents’ physical and mental health needs
were inadequate).
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suggest that it would have very likely survived a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment under the objective deliberate indifference standard.110
B.

Finding Steadier Legal Ground Under Objective Deliberate Indifference

The objective deliberate indifference standard raises the constitutional
minimum for mental health care, placing it on firmer legal and practical
grounds. When applied to Shenandoah Valley, both the professional judgment
and objective deliberate indifference standards likely lead to the same
outcome—a remand to the lower court with instructions to take a more nuanced
look at the minimum amount of mental health care guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the benefits of adopting objective deliberate
indifference over professional judgment are both legal and practical.
1. Legal and Practical Benefits of the Objective Deliberate Indifference
Standard
By mandating and adjusting the professional judgment standard, the
majority put a target on its holding’s back. The dissent was quick to point out
that this standard had never been applied in the context of juvenile detention
facilities and that doing so without any guidance from the legislature
constituted a judicial overreach.111 By adopting the objective deliberate
indifference standard, the Shenandoah Valley majority would have softened the
blow of the dissent’s argument. If the majority would have applied the very
deliberate indifference standard for which the dissent advocates, rather than
blazing a new trail with the professional judgment standard, it would have
shifted the categorical disagreement over which standard should apply to an
interpretive disagreement over how the standard should apply.
An additional benefit to adopting the objective deliberate indifference
standard is that it would have avoided a circuit split. Ironically, the dissent cites
the Third Circuit’s Luzerne County decision as an example of the standard that
should have applied.112 As discussed above in Section IV.A, the factual
similarities between Shenandoah Valley and Luzerne County suggest that the
Third Circuit still would have remanded with slightly different instructions. By
avoiding the circuit split, the dissent’s argument loses another important
anchor, leaving opponents of raising the constitutional minimum for mental
health care with little more than a personal preference for security over
rehabilitation.

110. See supra Introduction (detailing the facility staff’s treatment of UACs in their custody).
111. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 348–49 (4th Cir.) (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
112. Id. at 351 (citing Luzerne County, 372 F.3d at 579).
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Finally, the administrative benefits of adopting a single standard for
determining constitutionally adequate mental health care for civil detainees
cannot be understated. Until federal and state detention facilities are better able
to organize their populations, an issue that lies beyond the scope of this Recent
Development, the demand to comply with a complex tapestry of varying
standards is unrealistic.113 Instead, the most sensible solution is to take the class
of civil detainees who are entitled to the highest level of minimally adequate
mental health care and apply that to all classes of detainees. Given that virtually
any class of detainee may occupy the same physical space as another,114 applying
the least stringent standard is the only plausible way to guarantee a detained
person’s constitutional rights are protected.
By adopting the objective deliberate indifference standard, the Fourth
Circuit would have forced a greater degree of administrative responsibility on
state detention centers to provide a more viable form of minimally adequate
mental health care not just to juvenile detainees, but to all detainees for whom
the deliberate indifference standard is the accepted mode of analysis.
CONCLUSION
The professional judgment standard was intended to give civilly detained
plaintiffs an easier burden when raising § 1983 claims against the government.
On the one hand, the Fourth Circuit did reach an outcome that was true to the
professional judgment standard’s original purpose. The majority met its duty
to protect the constitutional rights of a uniquely vulnerable class of juvenile
detainees. It both raised the floor of minimally adequate health care and took
an affirmative step towards recognizing the right independently of the state’s
punitive interests. On other hand, because the court took such a significant step
in raising the constitutional minimum for adequate mental health care for
UACs, it could have—and should have—done more to protect its holding from
future attack. Ultimately, the court missed an opportunity to shore up the
widely accepted deliberate indifference standard. The effect could have been a
broad raising of the bar for minimally adequate mental health care while being
less susceptible to future legal challenges. Instead, the court leaves access to
adequate mental health care for detained persons at risk while also creating a
circuit split vulnerable to either judicial or legislative backlash.
The Supreme Court christened the deliberate indifference standard in an
era where the distinction between civil and penal detainees was less entangled.
Today that boundary is not nearly as identifiable. By resuscitating the
professional judgment standard over the deliberate indifference standard, the
Fourth Circuit reinforces the reductive civil-penal divide while aiming for an
113. See supra Part I.
114. Hernández, supra note 15, at 1386–88.
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enlightened outcome in an attempt to leap forward while keeping its feet firmly
planted in the past.
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